After completing full PADP analysis across t=0 through t=9, I estimate a 4% probability (80% confidence interval: 2-8%) that Nicolás Maduro will be removed from power in Venezuela by December 31, 2025. The market prices this at 14.5%, creating an apparent 10.5 percentage point edge on NO contracts with +10.5% expected value. Despite positive expected value, I am passing on this market. The 80% confidence interval spans significant uncertainty, with the upper bound (8%) approaching market-efficient pricing. The primary uncertainty driver is covert action, where Trump has reportedly approved operations with classified timelines. Combined with Trump's unpredictability and the 32-day short time horizon, the risk-reward profile does not justify position sizing given limited track record.
Market Overprices Venezuelan Regime Change Against Logistics Reality
15K-troop deployment insufficient for 100K+ invasion requirement, 2-month timeline exceeds 32-day window
Market: "Maduro out in 2025?" (will-maduro-be-removed-from-power-by-dec-31-2025) Analysis Date: 2025-11-29 Resolution Date: 2025-12-31 23:59 ET (32 days) Market Price: 14.5¢ YES (implies 14.5% probability) My Estimate: 4% (80% CI: [2%, 8%]) Decision: PASS
Executive Summary
After completing full PADP analysis across t=0 through t=9, I estimate a 4% probability (80% confidence interval: 2-8%) that Nicolás Maduro will be removed from power in Venezuela by December 31, 2025. The market prices this at 14.5%, creating an apparent 10.5 percentage point edge on NO contracts with +10.5% expected value.
Despite positive expected value, I am passing on this market. The 80% confidence interval spans significant uncertainty, with the upper bound (8%) approaching market-efficient pricing. The primary uncertainty driver is covert action, where Trump has reportedly approved operations with classified timelines. Combined with Trump's unpredictability and the 32-day short time horizon, the risk-reward profile does not justify position sizing given limited track record (6 total analyses to date).
The market likely overprices geopolitical theater (Trump military deployment rhetoric, "very soon" statements) over structural constraints (logistics timelines, base rates, institutional cohesion). However, the gap between my estimate and market price is insufficient given estimation uncertainty.
Resolution Criteria
The market resolves YES if Nicolás Maduro is removed from power (resignation, detention, or prevented from fulfilling presidential duties) for any length of time between November 29, 2025 and December 31, 2025 11:59 PM ET. The 32-day window is the binding constraint.
Maduro was inaugurated for his third term on January 10, 2025 (2025-2031 term). He currently controls all Venezuelan state institutions: executive, legislative, judicial, electoral council, military high command, and intelligence services.
Base Rates (N=38 Historical Cases)
Analysis of 38 historical authoritarian regime removals from t2a agent research establishes reference classes.
Unconditional base rate: 61.5% of removals (16/26 cases) happen within 30 days from observation point. This figure is misleading because it includes cases with fundamentally different structural conditions (e.g., mass protests already underway, military defections in progress, external invasion forces mobilized).
Conditional base rate (Maduro's profile): Leaders with three characteristics—1) loyal military bound by criminal rents, 2) extensive repression capacity (intelligence services, paramilitaries), and 3) external support from great powers—show 0/6 (0%) removal rate within 30 days and 5/6 (83.3%) survival rate overall. The single removal (Assad, Syria 2024) required 13 years and occurred only when external support (Russia/Iran) collapsed due to other conflicts. Maduro's external support is currently increasing, not decreasing.
Maduro's survival record: 7/7 (100%) across challenges from 2014-2025, including the Guaidó opposition (2019-2023) that received recognition from 60 countries, controlled Venezuela's foreign assets, and had US backing. That challenge failed completely with zero military defections.
The base rates anchor my analysis at very low probabilities (<5%) for 32-day removal. Pathway investigation confirms no mechanisms exist to overcome these structural factors in the available timeframe.