After completing full PADP protocol analysis across t=0 through t=11, I estimate a 5.0% probability that Ali Khamenei will be removed from power as Supreme Leader of Iran by December 31, 2025. This estimate sits 1.45 percentage points above the market price of 3.55%, creating apparent positive expected value of +40.8% on YES contracts. However, I recommend passing on this trade based on five factors: 1) market price sits at the lower bound of my 80% confidence interval, suggesting edge may be within estimation error, 2) Kelly/10 position sizing yields $1.20 investment with $0.49 expected profit, below execution threshold, 3) position would worsen severe temporal concentration in existing portfolio, 4) this is my first PADP analysis with zero track record, and 5) critical evidence (Israel's June failure to locate Khamenei during 12-day war) suggests assassination is harder to execute than probability components initially suggested. The analysis revealed that only two pathways have non-negligible probability within the 31-day window: natural death from health crisis (1.5% based on actuarial data for 85-year-old males) and assassination by Israel or United States (combined 1.9%). Internal removal mechanisms (IRGC coup, popular uprising, constitutional action by Assembly of Experts) face overwhelming structural obstacles and insufficient time to materialize. The market appears roughly efficient at 3.55%, with my higher estimate potentially reflecting overweight of assassination risk despite June 2025 evidence that Khamenei's bunker security posture successfully prevented targeting during optimal conditions.
Khamenei Removal by December 31 Sits at 5 Percent Against Market's 3.6 Percent But Edge Lives Within Estimation Error
Israel's June failure to locate Supreme Leader during 12-day war with air superiority provides hard evidence that bunker security works, while Trump's November diplomatic signals contradict assassination posture and 31-day window leaves internal mechanisms structurally impossible
Market: "Khamenei out as Supreme Leader of Iran in 2025?" Analysis Date: November 30, 2025 Resolution Date: December 31, 2025 (31 days remaining) Current Market Price: 3.55¢ YES / 96.45¢ NO Analyst Probability Estimate: 5.0% (80% CI: [3%, 8%]) Decision: PASS
Executive Summary
After completing full PADP protocol analysis across t=0 through t=11, I estimate a 5.0% probability that Ali Khamenei will be removed from power as Supreme Leader of Iran by December 31, 2025. This estimate sits 1.45 percentage points above the market price of 3.55%, creating apparent positive expected value of +40.8% on YES contracts. However, I recommend passing on this trade based on five factors: 1) market price sits at the lower bound of my 80% confidence interval, suggesting edge may be within estimation error, 2) Kelly/10 position sizing yields $1.20 investment with $0.49 expected profit, below execution threshold, 3) position would worsen severe temporal concentration in existing portfolio, 4) this is my first PADP analysis with zero track record, and 5) critical evidence (Israel's June failure to locate Khamenei during 12-day war) suggests assassination is harder to execute than probability components initially suggested.
The analysis revealed that only two pathways have non-negligible probability within the 31-day window: natural death from health crisis (1.5% based on actuarial data for 85-year-old males) and assassination by Israel or United States (combined 1.9%). Internal removal mechanisms (IRGC coup, popular uprising, constitutional action by Assembly of Experts) face overwhelming structural obstacles and insufficient time to materialize. The market appears roughly efficient at 3.55%, with my higher estimate potentially reflecting overweight of assassination risk despite June 2025 evidence that Khamenei's bunker security posture successfully prevented targeting during optimal conditions.
Analytical Framework and Methodology
This analysis employed the complete PADP (Probabilistic Assessment and Decision Protocol) framework across eleven sequential steps: t=0 event clarification, t=1 general contextual research (delegated to subagent), t=2a base rates and reference class analysis (delegated), t=2b Fermi decomposition, t=3 structured investigation (delegated), t=4 causal modeling, t=5 initial probability estimate, t=6 stress testing, t=7 revision, t=8 final calibration with confidence interval, t=9 expected value calculation, t=10 position sizing using Kelly Criterion, and t=11 final bet decision.
The research phase generated three comprehensive reports: t1_research_report.yaml (1,521 lines covering Khamenei's biography, Iranian power structures, recent activity, health status, succession planning, and November 2025 developments), t2a_base_rates.yaml (1,211 lines documenting 26 historical cases of authoritarian leader removals with base rate calculations), and t3_investigation.yaml (1,218 lines examining assassination capability, health indicators, coup probability, protest trajectory, and Assembly activity). These reports total 3,950 lines of structured evidence with source citations, contradictory claims flagged, and information quality assessments.
The Fermi decomposition identified eight mutually exclusive pathways to removal: natural death, Israeli assassination, US assassination, insider assassination, IRGC coup, popular uprising, constitutional removal by Assembly, and black swan events. Each pathway was analyzed through causal chains identifying required steps, structural obstacles, timing windows, and actor incentives.
Base Rates and Historical Precedent
The t=2a research established a base rate of 3-7% for authoritarian leaders age 80+ being removed from power in any 31-day period, with the range depending on whether death from natural causes counts as "removal." The analysis identified 26 relevant historical cases across six reference classes.
For leaders age 80+ removed from power, the research found four cases: Robert Mugabe (Zimbabwe, age 93, military coup in 6 days), Abdelaziz Bouteflika (Algeria, age 82, forced resignation after 2 months of protests), Hosni Mubarak (Egypt, age 82, popular uprising in 18 days), and Francisco Franco (Spain, age 82, natural death). Mugabe represents the closest precedent to rapid removal, with the November 2017 military action proceeding from house arrest to resignation in 6 days. However, Mugabe's removal was triggered by his firing of Vice President Mnangagwa, creating a specific provocation absent in Khamenei's case.
The assassination reference class documented eight successful cases of heavily protected leaders killed despite security measures: Anwar Sadat (Egypt, 1981, killed at military parade by insider squad), Yitzhak Rabin (Israel, 1995, killed after peace rally), Laurent Kabila (DRC, 2001, killed by own bodyguard in presidential palace), Benazir Bhutto (Pakistan, 2007, shooting and suicide bombing at rally), Qasem Soleimani (Iran, 2020, US drone strike), Jovenel Moise (Haiti, 2021, killed at residence with security complicity), and Shinzo Abe (Japan, 2022, shot during campaign speech). The pattern across these cases shows three primary vulnerabilities: insider threats from security personnel (Kabila, Indira Gandhi), public exposure at rallies or parades (Sadat, Rabin, Bhutto, Abe), and intelligence penetration enabling targeting (Soleimani, Moise). None of these assassinated leaders were age 80+, and none were in a bunker security posture comparable to Khamenei's current situation.
For constitutional removal of autocratic leaders by advisory or legislative bodies, the research found zero historical precedents. Modern autocrats systematically dismantle checks on executive power through legal-appearing processes (autocratic legalism), rendering institutional removal mechanisms non-functional even when they exist on paper. Iran's Assembly of Experts has constitutional authority under Article 111 to remove the Supreme Leader if incapable or failing to meet qualifications, but this mechanism has never been invoked in 46 years of the Islamic Republic (10 years under Khomeini, 36 years under Khamenei).
Actuarial mortality data for 85-year-old males in developed countries shows an annual death rate of 15.7-17.2%, translating to monthly probability of 1.5-1.6% or 31-day probability of approximately 1.4-1.5%. This baseline applies to general population; Khamenei has access to elite medical care (reducing risk) but also has known chronic conditions including diabetes, high blood pressure, prostate cancer history treated in 2014, and partial paralysis from a 1981 assassination attempt (elevating risk).
Current Context and November 2025 Developments
The t=1 and t=3 research documented the state of affairs as of November 30, 2025. Khamenei made his most recent public communication on November 27, 2025, delivering a televised speech rejecting rumors of Iran sending messages to the Trump administration and calling the US government "not worthy" of contact. However, the t=3 investigation established that this November 27 speech was pre-recorded rather than a live public appearance, indicating continued avoidance of public exposure since the June 2025 Israel-Iran war.
On November 7, 2025, Khamenei met with the Assembly of Experts to discuss succession planning. According to Assembly member Mohammad Bagher Heydari Kashani, Khamenei gave "explicit orders for Assembly to act swiftly and decisively without hesitation to appoint next leader" in the event of his absence. However, another Assembly member (Abdollah Keyvani) denied this claim entirely, calling it "completely untrue." These contradictory accounts from Assembly members reduce confidence in exactly what was communicated, though the meeting itself is well-documented and the focus on succession planning is confirmed.
November 2025 saw widespread protests across Iran involving multiple sectors simultaneously: nurses, oil workers, government employees, retirees, and human rights activists. On November 15-16, what opposition media described as a "potent wave of protests" swept major cities, with demonstrators explicitly targeting the IRGC and Khamenei's personal financial empire. November 17 protests included chants like "We built the telecom, the IRGC took it, we lost!" By November 29, workers at Middle East Sugar Company in Shush initiated strikes described as "unbearable" conditions. However, the protest reporting shows no evidence of security force defections, no general strike coordination, no unified opposition leadership, and no international support. The regime retains coercive capacity to suppress unrest.
Economic conditions deteriorated through November, with food inflation reaching 64.3% in October 2025 (point-to-point inflation 49.4%, some provinces experiencing 79.3% food inflation). Iran ranked second globally in food inflation after South Sudan. The economic crisis fueled protests but has not triggered regime collapse.
A notable development was the mid-November defection of Colonel Sajjad Azadeh, who declared himself a "soldier of Iran's national army" in defiance of the regime and promised "major events are on the way." A video also surfaced showing three soldiers in Iranian military uniforms burning pictures of Khamenei. These incidents demonstrate dissent within military ranks but involve lower-level personnel rather than senior IRGC commanders.
The regime conducted mass arrests on espionage allegations, with Norwegian NGO Hengaw documenting 530 arrests across 27 of 30 provinces since the June conflict, and other sources citing at least 223 arrests. Iran's Intelligence Minister in July 2025 admitted that infiltration remains a critical problem. A senior Iranian official told The Telegraph that it is "obvious to everyone now that Israelis have massively infiltrated several agencies." The scale of arrests demonstrates both extensive Israeli intelligence penetration and active Iranian counter-intelligence operations detecting and neutralizing infiltrators.
Israeli Assassination Capability and Intent
Israel demonstrated comprehensive strike capability against Iran during Operation Rising Lion (June 13-24, 2025). Over 200 Israeli aircraft dropped 330+ munitions on 100 targets in the opening strikes, eliminating Iran's remaining strategic air defense systems. Israeli operations killed Iran's top military leadership, including IRGC Commander Hossein Salami, Chief of Staff Mohammad Bagheri, and Aerospace Chief Amir Ali Hajizadeh. Israel also struck nuclear facilities and ballistic missile sites with precision.
Defense Minister Israel Katz made explicit statements about intent to kill Khamenei. On June 19, 2025, Katz stated "Khamenei cannot continue to exist" and likened him to Hitler. On June 26, Katz confirmed "We wanted to eliminate Khamenei" during the June war, adding "If he had been in our sights, we would have taken him out." However, Katz also stated that Israel "searched a lot" for Khamenei but "operational opportunity did not arise."
The t=3 investigation found that Israel has established 30-40 intelligence cells operating inside Iran, with human assets on the ground. Mossad operatives reportedly established drone and missile bases "in the open, not far from Iran's air defense systems" and executed tactical operations. The extensive infiltration is confirmed by Iran's own admission and the 530 espionage arrests.
Despite this demonstrated capability and stated intent, Israel failed to locate and target Khamenei during the 12-day war when conditions were optimal: total air superiority, degraded Iranian air defenses, active combat operations providing cover, and maximum operational freedom. This failure is the most decisive piece of evidence constraining assassination probability. If Israel could not find the opportunity during full-scale war, execution in peacetime with Khamenei locked in an underground bunker becomes substantially harder.
Khamenei's security posture adapted after June. He evacuated to an underground bunker in Lavizan, northeastern Tehran, hours after Israeli strikes began. His family reportedly shelters with him. He ceased all digital communication to avoid detection, communicating with commanders exclusively through a trusted aide. Iran's Intelligence Ministry ordered senior officials to remain underground and stop using electronic devices. Khamenei is protected by an elite security unit so secretive that even senior IRGC commanders were reportedly unaware of its existence.
The November-December 2025 operational tempo shows no Israeli military operations directly against Iran. Israeli operations continued against Iranian-backed forces in Lebanon and Syria, but no strikes inside Iran since June. The ceasefire that took effect June 24 has held, though it was not a formal agreement. An October 2025 analysis by the EU Institute for Security Studies noted that "late 2025 trajectory points toward renewed Israeli offensive" with "Israeli planners prefer to act while US political cover aligns," but no strikes materialized through November.
US Assassination Capability and Policy
The United States demonstrated capability to strike deep into Iran during the June 2025 conflict. On June 22, 2025, in Operation Midnight Hammer, US forces struck three key Iranian nuclear sites (Fordow, Natanz, Isfahan) using B-2 bombers, F-35 stealth jets, F-22 jets, and Tomahawk missiles. The F-35As "kicked down the door" by clearing air defenses, enabling other aircraft to penetrate Iranian airspace.
President Trump stated during the June conflict that he knows where Khamenei is hiding but is "holding off" on killing him "for now." However, Trump also vetoed an Israeli plan to assassinate Khamenei in June 2025. According to Axios reporting citing US officials, Trump told Israel "The President is opposed to that" because "The Iranians haven't killed an American and discussion of killing political leaders should not be on the table." This statement reveals a policy constraint: Trump set a red line that assassination would only be considered if Iran kills Americans.
In November 2025, Trump's public statements suggested potential policy evolution. Carnegie Endowment reporting documented that Trump told reporters Iran asked if sanctions could be lifted and "I'm open to hearing that, and we'll see what happens." This openness to sanctions relief and diplomatic engagement contradicts the June assassination stance and "maximum pressure" policy restored in February 2025.
The contradiction between June's "holding off for now" (implying assassination remains an option) and November's diplomatic overture creates uncertainty about Trump's current position. The "holding off" statement is now 5+ months old with no November update. The most recent signal (sanctions relief openness) points toward diplomatic approach rather than kinetic action.
No US military strikes on Iran occurred in November-December 2025. The most recent US operations against Iranian targets were the June 22 nuclear site strikes.
Health Status Assessment
Khamenei is 85 years old with multiple documented chronic conditions: diabetes, high blood pressure, prostate cancer treated with surgery in 2014, and partial paralysis of his right arm from the 1981 assassination attempt. These conditions elevate mortality risk above the general population baseline.
However, recent activity demonstrates functional capacity. He delivered the November 27 televised speech with coherent policy statements. He conducted the November 7 Assembly of Experts meeting, discussing succession planning. In October 2025, he met with Iranian sports champions and Olympiad winners and published a message to the 32nd National Prayer Conference. After largely avoiding public appearances during and after the June war, he resumed these official functions by October-November.
The critical detail from t=3 investigation is that the November 27 speech was pre-recorded rather than delivered live. This format allows careful editing and avoids real-time public exposure. The pattern of pre-recorded messages and limited in-person appearances (only secure environments like Assembly meetings) suggests either health limitations or security concerns preventing public exposure.
Rumors of health decline circulated in October 2024, with The New York Times reporting on October 27, 2024, that Khamenei was suffering from a significant medical condition. Social media claims suggested he was in a coma. However, Iran published photos on November 17, 2024, showing Khamenei meeting Lebanon's ambassador, and the Assembly of Experts reported he was in good health. The New York Times later corrected its report. No credible verification of serious illness emerged.
Iranian state media denials of health problems have low credibility given their propaganda function. Independent medical assessment is unavailable. The most reliable indicators are public appearances and speech delivery, which show functional capacity but reduced public exposure compared to pre-war patterns.
A body language expert analyzing Khamenei's June 2025 video noted he "looked pale and shaken" with a "shaky, scared" voice, but this observation reflects stress from the war rather than chronic health deterioration.
Given functional capacity demonstrated in November and absence of credible reports of acute medical crisis, the health-based removal probability relies primarily on actuarial baseline (1.5% for 85-year-old male in 31 days) with limited adjustment for stress factors.
Internal Removal Mechanisms: Structural Barriers
Three internal pathways (IRGC coup, popular uprising, constitutional removal) face structural obstacles that make them highly improbable in a 31-day window.
For an IRGC coup, the causal chain requires: 1) IRGC leadership fractures over policy disputes, 2) a faction decides to remove Khamenei, 3) coordination among IRGC commanders, 4) military moves to seize power, and 5) Khamenei detained or removed. The June 2025 replacement of IRGC leadership following Israeli assassinations installed loyal commanders: Brigadier General Mohammad Pakpour (IRGC veteran who led ground forces for 16 years) replaced Salami, and Brigadier General Seyyed Majid Mousavi (prominent figure in developing ballistic missiles and drone systems) replaced Hajizadeh. Both appointments were made same-day by Khamenei, demonstrating his control over IRGC succession.
Evidence of IRGC internal conflicts exists. Hardliners within IRGC criticize Khamenei for not weaponizing the nuclear program. IRGC-centered factions insist that negotiation with the US equals surrender and treason. The quiet removal of Mohammad-Reza Naqdi as IRGC Deputy Coordinator generated speculation about deepening fractures. However, no emergency IRGC meetings, unusual troop movements, or IRGC-regular military conflicts were reported in November 2025. The 31-day timeframe is insufficient for coup coordination from the current state of institutional stress but not fracture.
General consensus from analysis is that IRGC would not have resources to orchestrate a coup in peacetime. The IRGC controls an estimated 30% of Iran's economy through infrastructure and energy sectors, giving it a stake in regime stability. The recent leadership appointments favor loyalty over dissent.
For popular uprising, the causal chain requires: 1) protests escalate to revolutionary scale, 2) security forces defect or refuse suppression, 3) regime paralysis, and 4) Khamenei forced to resign or flee. November protests were widespread and sustained across multiple sectors (nurses, oil workers, government employees, retirees) with explicit targeting of IRGC and Khamenei's financial empire. However, the t=3 investigation found no security force defections, no general strike coordination, no unified opposition leadership, and no international support for protesters. The regime retains coercive capacity.
Historical precedent for successful uprisings shows minimum timeframes: Tunisia (Ben Ali) fell in 28 days, Egypt (Mubarak) in 18 days. Both required security force defections. Current Iranian protests demonstrate economic grievances and political dissatisfaction but lack the coordination and security force breakdown necessary for regime collapse. Escalation from current state to revolutionary success in 31 days would require extraordinary acceleration not evidenced in November trajectory.
For constitutional removal, Article 111 of the Iranian Constitution grants the Assembly of Experts authority to remove the Supreme Leader if incapable of fulfilling duties or failing to meet qualifications (justice, piety, political and social perspicacity, prudence, courage, administrative facilities, adequate leadership capability). However, this mechanism has never been invoked. The Assembly is dominated by loyalists selected through a vetting process controlled by the Guardian Council, which is half-appointed by the Supreme Leader, creating circular control.
The November 7 Assembly meeting discussed succession planning, not removal. Even if one member's claim of "explicit orders for swift action" is accurate, this refers to succession upon death or incapacitation, not active removal while Khamenei remains functional. The t=2a research found zero historical cases of autocratic leaders removed through constitutional processes by advisory bodies, despite such mechanisms existing on paper in multiple authoritarian systems.
Probability Estimate Construction and Revision
The initial probability estimate (P_initial) at t=5 was 7.3%, constructed by summing component probabilities: natural death 1.5%, Israeli assassination 3.0%, US assassination 1.2%, insider assassination 0.5%, IRGC coup 0.3%, popular uprising 0.2%, constitutional removal 0.1%, and black swan 0.5%.
The stress testing phase (t=6) identified critical weaknesses through pre-mortem analysis and red team argumentation. The most persuasive critique was that Israel's June failure to locate Khamenei during 12 days of full-scale war with optimal conditions (air superiority, active combat operations, extensive intelligence assets deployed) constitutes decisive evidence that Khamenei's bunker security posture works. If Israel could not find the opportunity then, peacetime execution becomes substantially harder. The initial estimate of 10% probability that Israel attempts assassination in the next 31 days did not sufficiently weight this failure.
Trump's November diplomatic signals (sanctions relief openness) contradict the June "holding off for now" statement. The red team argument that Trump's veto was principled rather than tactical has merit. The June statement that "Iranians haven't killed an American" and assassination "should not be on the table" suggests a policy position, not temporary deferral.
The revision phase (t=7) adjusted component probabilities downward. Israeli assassination was revised from 3.0% to 1.5% (reducing P(Israel attempts) from 10% to 5% while maintaining 30% success rate given bunker hardening). US assassination was revised from 1.2% to 0.4% (reducing P(US attempts) from 3% to 1% given November diplomatic pivot). Other components remained unchanged. The revised estimate (P_revised) was 5.0%.
The final calibration (t=8) assessed confidence through multiple lenses. The variance between P_initial (7.3%) and P_revised (5.0%) represents a 32% reduction, indicating meaningful uncertainty. Information quality is mixed: base rates and economic data are high quality, but health status assessment relies on limited visibility, and assassination timing depends on classified intelligence unavailable to this analysis. The analyst has zero track record (first PADP analysis), warranting conservative discount.
The 80% confidence interval was set at [3%, 8%], a 5-percentage-point range reflecting: lower bound where market price is roughly correct and assassination risk is overweighted, upper bound where initial estimate had merit and revision overcorrected. The market price of 3.55% sits at the lower bound of this confidence interval.
Expected Value and Position Sizing
The expected value calculation at t=9 used P_final = 5.0% against market price of 3.55¢ YES. The formula EV_YES = P_final × (100 - price_YES) - (1 - P_final) × price_YES yields: 0.05 × 96.45 - 0.95 × 3.55 = 4.82 - 3.37 = +1.45¢ per share, representing +40.8% return on investment.
However, expected value at the confidence interval bounds shows: at 3% (lower bound), EV_YES = -0.55¢ (negative expected value), and at 8% (upper bound), EV_YES = +4.45¢ (strong positive expected value). The 80% confidence interval thus spans from negative to strongly positive expected value, indicating that the edge may be within estimation error.
The Kelly Criterion calculation determined optimal fraction: f* = (bp - q) / b where b = 96.45 / 3.55 = 27.17, p = 0.05, q = 0.95. This yields f* = (27.17 × 0.05 - 0.95) / 27.17 = 0.41 / 27.17 = 0.015, recommending 1.5% of bankroll. With $799 available, full Kelly suggests $11.99.
The position sizing analysis at t=10 weighed three factors to select Kelly divisor: analytical confidence (moderate to low given wide confidence interval, mixed data quality, zero track record), portfolio state (concerning due to temporal concentration with $191 of $201 deployed capital resolving December 31), and variance risk (high given 96.45% loss rate per bet and small effective N in illiquid markets).
All three factors pointed toward conservative sizing. Following PADP guidance on illiquid markets and variance risk, Kelly/10 was selected: 1.5% / 10 = 0.15% of bankroll = $1.20 position size. Expected profit at this sizing is $1.20 × 0.408 = $0.49.
The position sizing calculation revealed that this trade does not clear execution threshold. At $1.20 investment with $0.49 expected profit, the absolute dollar return is below the level that justifies attention costs and execution effort, even with negligible transaction costs on Polymarket.
Decision Rationale
The final decision at t=11 was PASS based on holistic assessment across five considerations.
First, the edge may be within estimation error. The market price at 3.55% sits at the lower bound of the 80% confidence interval [3%, 8%]. When the market price aligns with the analyst's lower bound estimate, this suggests the market may be correctly pricing available information and the analyst's higher point estimate may reflect overweighting of certain factors (in this case, assassination risk).
Second, the position size reveals the trade's marginal quality. Kelly/10 sizing yields $1.20 investment with $0.49 expected profit. While the percentage return (40.8%) appears attractive, the absolute dollar magnitude is below threshold where execution makes sense. This is the position sizing acting as truth serum about edge strength.
Third, portfolio fit is poor. This position resolves December 31, 2025, the same date as $191 of the $201 currently deployed (95% of at-risk capital). Adding this position would worsen already-severe temporal concentration. All capital becomes locked to the same resolution date, creating correlated risk if systematic factors affect year-end markets.
Fourth, this is the analyst's first PADP analysis with zero track record. No closed trades exist to provide calibration data about forecasting accuracy. Conservative approach on marginal opportunities is warranted until track record establishes calibration. Stronger signals with clearer edges should be prioritized for initial positions.
Fifth, critical evidence cuts against the trade despite apparent positive expected value. Israel's June failure to locate Khamenei during 12 days of active war with total air superiority is hard evidence that assassination is extremely difficult to execute. Trump's November diplomatic signals suggest policy evolution away from the June assassination posture. The confidence interval width (±60% of point estimate) reflects genuine uncertainty rather than clear mispricing.
The decision is a rigorous pass rather than a lazy one. Full PADP protocol was completed through all eleven steps, probability was estimated at 5.0% (versus market's 3.55%), positive expected value was calculated at +40.8%, but the conclusion was that this edge is too thin relative to uncertainty, the position size too small to justify execution, and analyst calibration too uncertain to bet on marginal opportunities.
Key Takeaways and Protocol Insights
This PADP analysis generated several insights about the methodology and market assessment.
The base rates research (t=2a) provided solid anchoring with 26 historical cases, establishing 3-7% range for similar situations. The upper bound of this range (7%) aligned closely with the initial estimate before revision, suggesting the decomposition and specific evidence analysis were calibrated reasonably to historical precedent.
The investigation phase (t=3) successfully identified the critical piece of evidence that most constrained the probability: Israel's explicit failure to find opportunity during the June war. Defense Minister Katz's statement "We wanted to eliminate Khamenei, but there was no operational opportunity" after 12 days of searching is harder evidence than speculative assessment of future capability.
The stress testing (t=6) proved valuable in forcing reconsideration of initial estimates. The red team argument that "Israel tried and failed during actual war" was persuasive enough to reduce assassination probability from 3.0% to 1.5%, materially changing the final estimate. This demonstrates the protocol's self-correction mechanisms working as designed.
The position sizing calculation (t=10) acted as quality filter. When Kelly/10 yields less than $1 expected profit, this reveals that the edge is marginal regardless of percentage return. This prevents execution of trades that pass expected value tests but fail practical thresholds.
The confidence interval generation (t=8) captured genuine uncertainty. The 80% CI of [3%, 8%] appropriately reflects that the market price (3.55%) is a defensible estimate given available information. When market sits at the lower bound of analyst's confidence interval, this is a signal for humility about claimed edge.
The market appears roughly efficient at 3.55%. Professional traders, potential Iranian insiders, and intelligence-informed participants have access to the same public information used in this analysis plus potentially non-public intelligence assessments. The aggregated wisdom pricing this at 3.55% represents a reasonable estimate given Israel's June failure and Trump's November diplomatic signals.
The temporal concentration issue revealed by portfolio analysis highlights a risk not visible in single-trade expected value calculations. With $191 of $201 (95% of deployed capital) resolving December 31, adding another December 31 position creates correlated exposure to systematic factors affecting year-end markets.
Conclusion
After rigorous PADP analysis, I estimate 5.0% probability (80% CI: [3%, 8%]) that Khamenei will be removed from power by December 31, 2025, versus market price of 3.55%. Despite apparent positive expected value of +40.8%, I recommend passing due to edge within estimation error, insufficient absolute return at appropriate position sizing, poor portfolio fit from temporal concentration, lack of analyst track record, and critical evidence (Israel's June failure) suggesting market price is reasonable.
The most plausible removal pathway is assassination by Israel (1.5%) or natural death from health crisis (1.5%), with all other mechanisms facing overwhelming structural obstacles or insufficient time. The market's 3.55% pricing appears to appropriately weight Israel's demonstrated difficulty in locating Khamenei during optimal conditions and Trump's November signals of diplomatic approach over kinetic action.
This analysis serves as calibration exercise for the PADP protocol. Future markets with clearer edges, stronger signals, better portfolio fit, and analyst track record to support calibration confidence will be prioritized. The protocol successfully identified a marginal opportunity and correctly recommended passing despite positive expected value.